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DISTINCT SOURCES OF LAW AND DISTINCT 
DOCTRINES: FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND 
PRUDENTIAL STANDING 
William James Goodling 
Abstract: Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Their jurisdiction is limited by 
subject-matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, and, to an uncertain extent, standing. While 
it is well established that Article III standing is jurisdictional, the federal circuit courts are 
divided on whether judge-made prudential standing is jurisdictional, and the Supreme Court 
has not directly weighed in. The jurisdictional status of a doctrine has two important 
procedural consequences. First, litigants cannot forfeit a defense for lack of jurisdiction, 
meaning that such a defense can be raised for the first time on appeal. Second, federal courts 
have a sua sponte obligation to ensure that jurisdiction is proper. This Comment contends 
that prudential standing should not be considered jurisdictional but that federal courts should 
nevertheless have the discretion to raise the issue sua sponte. Prudential standing should not 
be considered jurisdictional because considering a court-created doctrine as jurisdictional 
violates the basic principle that only the Constitution and Congress hold the power to set 
federal courts’ jurisdiction, because a recent line of Supreme Court cases reinforces that 
court-created doctrines cannot be jurisdictional, and because prudential standing concerns 
litigants’ lack of rights on the merits, not federal courts’ adjudicatory authority. Federal 
courts, however, should have a discretionary sua sponte ability to raise the issue because 
prudential standing is an inherently flexible doctrine, and because federal courts raise in their 
discretion three other non-jurisdictional doctrines—the requirement that habeas corpus 
petitioners exhaust state remedies, Pullman abstention doctrine, and prudential ripeness 
doctrine—that, like prudential standing, originated as judge-made doctrines designed to 
protect interests beyond the litigants’ individual interests. 
INTRODUCTION 
“Jurisdiction,” the Supreme Court has warned, “is a word of many, 
too many, meanings.”1 Accordingly, in a line of more than ten cases 
over the last decade,2 the Court has sought to “bring some discipline” to 
1. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 90 (1998) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also, e.g., City of Arlington, Tex. v. FCC, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1979 (2013) 
(same). 
2. See Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 817, 821 (2013); Gonzalez v. 
Thaler, __U.S.__, 132 S. Ct. 641, 646 (2012); Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, __U.S.__, 
131 S. Ct. 1197, 1202 (2011); Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., __U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2876–
77 (2010); Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 157 (2010); United Student Aid Funds, 
Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 271 (2010) (dictum); Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive 
Eng’rs, 558 U.S. 67, 81–86 (2009); John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 132–
34 (2008); Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 206–07 (2007); Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 
500, 514–15 (2006); Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 13 (2005) (per curiam); Kontrick v. 
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the use of the term.3 In this line of cases, the Court has refined the 
analysis concerning when a rule will be considered jurisdictional by 
distinguishing between jurisdictional rules,4 on the one hand, and 
elements of the merits5 or claim-processing rules,6 on the other hand. 
Despite this Supreme Court case law, a conspicuous jurisdictional 
question involving standing doctrine remains unresolved. Standing 
encompasses two distinct doctrines: prudential standing is a judge-made 
doctrine, while Article III standing derives from the U.S. Constitution.7 
Broadly speaking, both doctrines aim to limit the lawsuits in federal 
courts to only “real, earnest, and vital controvers[ies],”8 so as to ensure 
“the proper—and properly limited—role of the courts in a democratic 
society.”9 While the Court has clearly established that Article III 
standing is jurisdictional,10 the Court has not directly weighed in on 
whether prudential standing is jurisdictional,11 and the federal circuits 
are mired in a “deep and important circuit split” on the issue.12 Three 
circuit courts hold that prudential standing is jurisdictional,13 and seven 
Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 447 (2004); Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401, 413–14 (2004); United 
States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 631 (2002). 
3. Henderson, 131 S. Ct. at 1200. 
4. Id. at 1202 (“We have urged that a rule should not be referred to as jurisdictional unless it 
governs a court’s adjudicatory capacity, that is, its subject-matter or personal jurisdiction.”). 
5. Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 503 (“This case concerns the distinction between two sometimes 
confused or conflated concepts: federal-court ‘subject-matter’ jurisdiction over a controversy; and 
the essential ingredients of a federal claim for relief.”). 
6. Gonzalez, 132 S. Ct. at 648 (“[W]e have pressed a stricter distinction between truly 
jurisdictional rules, which govern a court’s adjudicatory authority, and nonjurisdictional claim-
processing rules, which do not.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
7.  E.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11–12 (2004). 
8.  Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc. 454 U.S. 
464, 471 (1982) (quoting Chi. & Grand Trunk R.R. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 345 (1892)); see 
also id. at 474–75. 
9.  Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975); see also id. at 499–500. 
10.  E.g., United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 742 (1995). 
11.  See infra Part I.E. But see Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 
__U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2610 (2010). 
12.  Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 693 F.3d 169, 185 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting), 
reh’g en banc denied, 704 F.3d 1005 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. denied, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 2880 
(2013). The First, Third, and Eighth Circuits have not yet reached the issue. See Lucas v. Jerusalem 
Café, LLC, 721 F.3d 927, 938–39 (8th Cir. 2013) (recognizing the circuit split but declining to 
reach a holding on the issue); Lewis v. Alexander, 685 F.3d 325, 340 n.14 (3d Cir. 2012) (same), 
cert. denied, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 933 (2013); UPS Worldwide Forwarding, Inc. v. U.S. Postal 
Serv., 66 F.3d 621, 626 n.6 (3d Cir. 1995) (same). 
13. The Second, Sixth, and D.C. Circuits adopted the minority rule that prudential standing is 
jurisdictional. See infra Part I.D.2.a. 
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circuit courts hold that it is not.14 
Rather than a matter of semantics, whether prudential standing is 
jurisdictional has “considerable practical importance for judges and 
litigants”15 because jurisdictional rules alter “the normal operation of our 
adversarial system.”16 In the normal adversarial system, if a party fails to 
raise an issue in district court proceedings, the party generally waives the 
issue on appeal.17 For jurisdictional issues, by contrast, a party does not 
waive disputing the issue on appeal by failing to dispute it in 
proceedings below, and, moreover, federal courts must raise 
jurisdictional issues sua sponte if jurisdiction is lacking.18 Because of 
these “drastic”19 jurisdictional procedures, litigants may be “disturbingly 
disarm[ed]”20 when the issue is raised for the first time on appeal, and 
“many months of work on the part of the attorneys and the court may be 
wasted” if jurisdiction is found to be lacking.21 Despite this potential for 
waste and unfairness, overriding structure-of-government concerns 
underlie these jurisdictional procedures: jurisdiction defines the 
institutional power of federal courts, and ensuring that federal courts 
only enter judgments within their proper institutional role is simply too 
fundamental to be waived.22 
14. The Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and Federal Circuits adopted the majority 
rule that prudential standing is not jurisdictional. See infra Part I.D.2.b. Within the seven circuits 
with the majority rule, however, the circuits are further divided on whether appellate courts 
nevertheless have the discretion to raise the issue sua sponte when a party has forfeited the issue. 
See infra Part I.D.2.c. 
15. Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, __U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1202 (2011). 
16. Id.; accord Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 817, 824 (2013). 
17. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(2)(C); see also, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 
487 (2008). See generally Robert J. Martineau, Considering New Issues on Appeal: The General 
Rule and the Gorilla Rule, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1023 (1987). 
18. E.g., Gonzales v. Thaler, __U.S.__, 132 S. Ct. 641, 648 (2012); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 
12(h)(3). The unique procedure associated with jurisdictional status does not attach, however, to 
personal jurisdiction. See infra Part I.B. Nonetheless, in line with the common usage in courts, this 
Comment refers to the procedure associated with jurisdictional status as being the procedure that 
attaches to all areas of jurisdiction except personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Henderson, 131 S. Ct. at 
1202–03 (acknowledging that personal jurisdiction is jurisdictional, yet describing the procedure of 
“jurisdiction” as being the procedure associated with subject-matter jurisdiction and Article III 
standing while failing to discuss the different procedure associated with personal jurisdiction). 
19. Henderson, 131 S. Ct. at 1202. 
20. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. at 824. 
21. Henderson, 131 S. Ct. at 1202. 
22. 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, EDWARD H. COOPER & RICHARD FREER, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3522, at 120–21 (3d ed. 2008); see also, e.g., Anderson v. 
H&R Block, Inc., 287 F.3d 1038, 1041 (11th Cir. 2002) (“When a federal court acts outside its 
jurisdiction, it violates principles of separation of powers and federalism, interfering with 
Congress’s authority to demarcate the jurisdiction of lower federal courts, and with the states’ 
 
                                                     
 
13 - Goodling Comment.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/10/2013  5:33 PM 
1156 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88:1153 
This Comment is divided into two parts: Background23 and 
Argument.24 First, the Background briefly surveys the relevant aspects 
of the other elements of federal jurisdiction: subject-matter 
jurisdiction,25 personal jurisdiction,26 and Article III standing.27 Second, 
the Background discusses prudential standing doctrine and the circuit 
courts’ divergent positions on whether it is jurisdictional.28 Third, the 
Background discusses the recent line of Supreme Court cases that has 
refined the analysis concerning when a rule should be considered 
jurisdictional.29 
The Argument advances two propositions. First, the Argument 
contends that prudential standing should not be considered 
jurisdictional,30 because only the Constitution and Congress hold the 
power to set federal courts’ jurisdiction,31 because the Supreme Court’s 
recent cases concerning jurisdiction reinforce that court-created 
doctrines cannot be jurisdictional,32 and because prudential standing 
concerns litigants’ lack of substantive rights on the merits, not federal 
courts’ adjudicatory authority.33 Second, the Argument contends that 
federal courts should nevertheless have the sua sponte discretion to raise 
prudential standing after a litigant has waived the issue,34 because 
prudential standing is an inherently flexible doctrine,35 and because 
federal courts raise in their discretion three other non-jurisdictional 
doctrines—the requirement that habeas corpus petitioners exhaust state 
remedies, Pullman abstention doctrine, and prudential ripeness 
doctrine—that, like prudential standing, originated as judge-made 
doctrines designed to protect interests beyond the litigants’ individual 
interests.36 
authority to resolve disputes in their own courts.”), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Beneficial 
Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1 (2003). 
23. Infra Part I. 
24. Infra Part II. 
25. See infra Part I.A. 
26. See infra Part I.B. 
27. See infra Part I.C. 
28. See infra Part I.D.  
29. See infra Part I.E. 
30. See infra Part II.A. 
31. See infra Part II.A.1. 
32. See infra Part II.A.2. 
33. See infra Part II.A.3. 
34. See infra Part II.B. 
35. See infra Part II.B.1. 
36. See infra Part II.B.2. 
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I.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Subject-Matter Jurisdiction 
Subject-matter jurisdiction is the authority of a court to decide a 
particular type of case.37 Article III of the Constitution provides that the 
“judicial Power of the United States shall extend to” nine categories of 
“Cases” and “Controversies,” such as suits arising under the 
Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States.38 This provision of 
Article III, however, does not itself confer jurisdiction on lower federal 
courts.39 Instead, Congress must authorize by statute lower federal court 
jurisdiction, within the outermost scope of potential jurisdiction 
provided by Article III’s nine categories of cases.40 This is so because 
under Article III, Congress has the discretion whether to create lower 
federal courts,41 which the Supreme Court has reasoned implies that 
Congress also holds the lesser power to define their jurisdiction.42 
Congress currently has set the district courts’ subject-matter jurisdiction 
to include matters arising under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of 
the United States,43 suits between diverse parties,44 and various subject- 
 
 
37. E.g., Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., __U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010). 
38. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
39. E.g., Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 84 (2010); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL 
JURISDICTION 278 (6th ed. 2012). For the Supreme Court, Article III itself confers to the Court its 
rarely used original subject-matter jurisdiction. E.g., California v. Arizona, 440 U.S. 59, 65 (1979). 
The extent of Congress’s power to regulate the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction under the 
Exceptions Clause, see U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2, is an unresolved question of constitutional 
law that scholars have thoroughly debated, see generally, Ralph A. Rossum, Congress, the 
Constitution, and the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: The Letter and the Spirit of the 
Exceptions Clause, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 385 (1983). 
40. E.g., Hertz Corp., 559 U.S. at 84.  
41. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one 
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and 
establish.”); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9 (granting Congress the power to create lower 
federal courts). 
42. See, e.g., Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 212–13 (2007) (“Because Congress decides 
whether federal courts can hear cases at all, it can also determine when, and under what conditions, 
federal courts can hear them.”); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 449 (1850); see also 
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 39, at 278–79 (“Ever since the first statute creating federal courts, the 
Judiciary Act of 1789, federal jurisdiction never has included the authority to adjudicate all matters 
allowed by Article III.”). 
43. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006). 
44. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006 & Supp. V 2007–2012). 
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specific claims,45 such as admiralty and maritime disputes.46 Congress 
currently has set the courts of appeals’ subject-matter jurisdiction to 
include all appeals from final decisions of the district courts.47 
A party cannot consent to subject-matter jurisdiction or waive the 
defense of lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.48 This rule is rooted in the 
rationale that parties, by their failure to dispute subject-matter 
jurisdiction, should not be able to confer jurisdiction on a federal court 
when Congress and the Constitution have not vested jurisdiction in the 
court.49 The rule is so inflexible that even the party who originally 
invoked federal jurisdiction can successfully challenge subject-matter 
jurisdiction after losing on the merits.50 Moreover, all federal courts—
trial and appellate—have a sua sponte obligation to dismiss a case if 
subject-matter jurisdiction is lacking in the case before the court.51 The 
appellate courts additionally have a sua sponte obligation to dismiss a 
case if subject-matter jurisdiction was lacking in the court below, even if 
it is satisfied in the appellate court.52 
In the American adversarial legal system, federal courts rarely have 
the sua sponte obligation to address an issue in a party’s suit.53 However, 
structural considerations require that courts ensure that subject-matter 
jurisdiction is proper even if litigants overlook it or attempt to consent to 
it.54 Because federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, allowing 
litigants to expand by consent the subject-matter jurisdiction of federal 
courts would be an invasion of state courts’ jurisdiction.55 Equally 
important, allowing litigants to expand the subject-matter jurisdiction of 
federal courts would authorize the federal judiciary to hear matters that 
45. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1333–1337, 1339–1345, 1347–1365 (2006); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1338, 1346 
(2006 & Supp. V 2007–2012). 
46. 28 U.S.C. § 1333. 
47. Id. § 1291; see also id. § 1292 (establishing the courts of appeals’ jurisdiction over 
interlocutory decisions). 
48. E.g., Gonzales v. Thaler, __U.S.__, 132 S. Ct. 641, 648 (2012); see also Reale Int’l, Inc. v. 
Fed. Rep. of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 330, 331–32 (2d Cir. 1981) (stating that this rule is “[g]raven in 
stone” and “enforced with draconian zeal”). 
49. See, e.g., Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17–18 (1951). 
50. See id. at 17–19.  
51. E.g., Gonzales, 132 S. Ct. at 648; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3). 
52. E.g., Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 73 (1997). 
53. E.g., Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, __U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1202 (2011). 
54. See, e.g., Anderson v. H&R Block, Inc., 287 F.3d 1038, 1041 (11th Cir. 2002), rev’d on other 
grounds sub nom. Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1 (2003). 
55. E.g., CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 28 (7th ed. 
2011); 13 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 22, at iv. 
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Congress and the Constitution reserved for the political branches of the 
federal government.56 In sum, Congress and the Constitution—not 
litigants—hold the power set federal courts’ subject-matter jurisdiction 
and thus to define the institutional role of the federal judiciary.57 
B.  Personal Jurisdiction 
Personal jurisdiction is the power of a court to decide a particular 
defendant’s case.58 Federal courts have personal jurisdiction over a 
defendant so long as the state court of general jurisdiction in the state 
where the federal court is located could subject the defendant to its 
jurisdiction consistently with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.59 Personal jurisdiction, however, serves a different purpose 
than subject-matter jurisdiction.60 While subject-matter jurisdiction 
derives from Article III and restricts the federal judiciary from infringing 
on its co-equal branches of government and on state judiciaries,61 
personal jurisdiction derives from the Due Process Clause and protects 
an individual’s liberty interest against being unfairly haled into a 
particular court.62 Thus, under International Shoe Co. v. Washington63 
and its progeny,64 the test for a federal court’s personal jurisdiction over 
a defendant requires that the “maintenance of the suit . . . not offend 
‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”65 Because 
personal jurisdiction represents an individual right, the party who holds 
that right can waive the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction or can 
give consent—whether express66 or implied67—to personal 
jurisdiction.68 
56. E.g., Anderson, 287 F.3d at 1041; Reale Int’l, Inc. v. Fed. Rep. of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 330, 332 
(2d Cir. 1981); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 39, at 40. 
57. See, e.g., Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17–18 (1951).  
58. See, e.g., Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
59. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k). 
60. Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 701 (1982). 
61. E.g., Anderson, 287 F.3d at 1041. 
62. Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd., 456 U.S. at 702–03.  
63. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
64. See, e.g., McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957). 
65. Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd., 456 U.S. at 702–03 (omission in original) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co., 326 
U.S. at 316). 
66. E.g., Nat’l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 316 (1964). 
67. See, e.g., Victory Transp. Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 
F.2d 354, 363 (2d Cir. 1964). 
68. Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd., 456 U.S. at 701–05; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(1). 
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C.  Article III Standing 
Article III standing derives from Article III of the Constitution and 
establishes the “Cases” and “Controversies” that the “judicial Power” 
may resolve.69 Because Article III standing is a constitutional limit, 
Congress cannot override it by statute.70 To establish Article III 
standing, the litigant must “prove that he has suffered a concrete and 
particularized injury that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct, 
and is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.”71 Though 
these elements are easily stated,72 Article III standing is a highly fact-
specific doctrine where cases are “more or less determined by the 
specific circumstances of individual situations.”73 
Nonetheless, the stated purposes and policies underlying Article III 
standing are profound. Perhaps foremost, Article III standing “is built on 
[the] single basic idea . . . of separation of powers,”74 because it prevents 
“the anti-majoritarian federal judiciary from usurping the policy-making 
functions of the popularly elected branches.”75 The Supreme Court has 
also reasoned that Article III standing ensures “that litigants are truly 
adverse and therefore likely to present the case effectively,”76 “that the 
people most directly concerned are able to litigate the question at 
issue,”77 and “that a concrete case informs the court of the real-world 
69. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see also Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94 (1968) (“[The words 
‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies’] have an iceberg quality, containing beneath their surface simplicity 
submerged complexities which go to the very heart of our constitutional form of government.”). But 
see Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 
17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 882 (1983) (contending that Article III standing is “surely not a 
linguistically inevitable conclusion” but endorsing the doctrine because it likely reflects the 
Framers’ understanding of the nature of judicial power). 
70. E.g., Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820 n.3 (1997). 
71. Hollingsworth v. Perry, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2661 (2013) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)). 
72. See 13A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3531, at 16 (3d ed. 2008). 
73. United States ex rel. Chapman v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 345 U.S. 153, 156 (1953). 
74. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984). 
75. William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 222 (1988) (citing 
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF 
POLITICS (1962); Scalia, supra note 69); accord Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2661 (“[Article III] 
standing . . . serves to prevent the judicial process from being used to usurp the powers of the 
political braches.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
76. Fletcher, supra note 75, at 222 (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) (other citation 
omitted)). 
77. Id. (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498–99 (1975) (other citations omitted)). 
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consequences of its decisions.”78 
Litigants cannot consent to Article III standing or waive the defense 
of lack of Article III standing.79 Litigants can thus challenge Article III 
standing at all stages of the litigation,80 even if the challenge occurs for 
the first time on appeal.81 Moreover, all federal courts—trial and 
appellate—have a sua sponte obligation to ensure that Article III 
standing is satisfied in the case before the court.82 Federal appellate 
courts additionally have a sua sponte obligation to dismiss a case if 
Article III standing was lacking in the court below, even if it is satisfied 
in the appellate court.83 Thus, the procedure for raising Article III 
standing mirrors the procedure for raising subject-matter jurisdiction.84 
The same structural concerns drive both procedures: litigants cannot, by 
consent or waiver, alter the requirements of Article III because Article 
III defines the separation of powers within the federal government and 
the federalism balance between the federal and state judiciaries.85 
D.  Prudential Standing 
1.  The Substance of Prudential Standing 
Prudential standing derives from “judicially self-imposed limits on 
the exercise of federal jurisdiction,” not from the Constitution or 
statute.86 Accordingly, Congress may override prudential standing limits 
by statute,87 and because the doctrines are judge-made, the Supreme 
Court can and does craft prudential standing exceptions.88 The Court has 
created three primary prudential standing doctrines: (1) the prohibition 
against third-party standing,89 (2) the prohibition against generalized 
78. Id. (citing Baker, 369 U.S. at 204 (other citations omitted)). 
79. E.g., United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 742 (1995). 
80. E.g., Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 255 (1994). 
81. E.g., Belitskus v. Pizzingrilli, 343 F.3d 632, 639 (3d Cir. 2003). 
82. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta, 534 U.S. 103, 110 (2001) (per curiam). 
83. E.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 95 (1998). 
84. See supra Part I.A. 
85. 13B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 72, § 3531.15, at 302 (“All of the sensitivities that surround 
subject-matter jurisdiction are evident [in the procedures of Article III standing].”). 
86. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 
468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)). But see Scalia, supra note 69, at 885 (“[Prudential standing is] 
unsatisfying . . . because it leaves unexplained the Court’s source of authority for simply granting or 
denying standing as its prudence might dictate.”). 
87. E.g., Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997). 
88. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 39, at 85–91. 
89. E.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975). 
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grievances,90 and (3) the zone-of-interests test.91 Even if a litigant 
satisfies Article III standing, these prudential standing doctrines provide 
an independent reason for the case to be dismissed.92 
First, the prohibition against third-party standing requires that a 
plaintiff “must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest 
his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.”93 In 
MainStreet Organization of Realtors v. Calumet City,94 for example, a 
city ordinance forbade the sale of homes without a city inspection for 
compliance with certain codes.95 An association of real estate brokers 
sued the city, claiming that the ordinance deprived homeowners of 
property without due process of law, and won a preliminary injunction to 
enjoin the city from enforcing the ordinance.96 On appeal, however, the 
Seventh Circuit vacated the injunction and dismissed the suit.97 The 
court held that the brokers violated the prohibition against third-party 
standing because the brokers were not the ordinance’s “immediate 
victim”; instead, homeowners were.98 The brokers could not assert the 
90. E.g., United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176–77 (1974). However, because a 
subsequent case, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992), appeared to describe the 
prohibition on generalized grievances as a constitutional doctrine, uncertainty surrounds whether it 
is a prudential or constitutional limit. See id. at 573–75; accord Hollingsworth v. Perry, __U.S.__, 
133 S. Ct. 2652, 2662 (2013) (appearing to describe the prohibition on generalized grievances as 
constitutional); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 39, at 99–101; Craig A. Stern, Another Sign 
from Hein: Does the Generalized Grievance Fail a Constitutional or a Prudential Test of Federal 
Standing to Sue?, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1169 (2008). This Comment assumes that the 
prohibition on generalized grievances is a prudential doctrine. However, if it is a constitutional 
doctrine, then it must be jurisdictional like the rest of Article III standing. See supra Part I.C. 
91. E.g., Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970). The 
Supreme Court has also evoked prudential principles in other settings, but these decisions have not 
yet developed into extensive doctrines in the way that the three primary prudential doctrines have. 
See United States v. Windsor, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2687–88 (2013) (holding that the parties’ 
absence of legal adverseness is a prudential concern that may be outweighed by countervailing 
considerations); Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist., 542 U.S. at 11–18 (holding that prudential standing 
concerns are implicated when a constitutional decision depends on disputed family law rights). 
92. Warth, 422 U.S. at 499. 
93. Id. The Court, however, has created four exceptions to the prohibition against third-party 
standing: (1) where the third party is unlikely to be able to sue; (2) where a close relationship exists 
between the plaintiff and third party; (3) where the case relates to the overbreadth doctrine; and (4) 
where the third party is an association suing on behalf of its members. See CHEMERINSKY, supra 
note 39, at 85–91, 108–11. 
94. 505 F.3d 742 (7th Cir. 2007). 
95. Id. at 743–44. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. at 749. 
98. Id. at 745–46. 
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rights of these third parties.99 
Second, the prohibition against generalized grievances precludes a 
party from establishing standing when the alleged harm is “a generalized 
grievance shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large class of 
citizens.”100 In United States v. Richardson,101 for example, the plaintiff 
alleged that the statutes that provide for the secrecy of the Central 
Intelligence Agency’s budget violate the Constitution’s requirement that 
“a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of 
all public Money shall be published from time to time.”102 The Supreme 
Court, however, held that the plaintiff lacked standing because he 
claimed injury only as a citizen and a taxpayer and was thus “seeking to 
employ a federal court as a forum in which to air his generalized 
grievances about the conduct of government.”103 The doctrine’s rationale 
is that redressing injuries that are “undifferentiated and common to all 
members of the public”104 must be “committed to the surveillance of 
Congress, and ultimately to the political process,” not federal courts.105 
Third, the zone-of-interests test requires that a plaintiff suing under a 
statute must be “arguably within the zone of interests” that Congress 
intended to benefit by enacting the statute.106 This test forecloses a 
lawsuit “only when a plaintiff’s interests are so marginally related to or 
inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot 
reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to permit the suit.”107 The 
zone-of-interests test has principally been applied to challenges to 
agency actions under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),108 and 
the Supreme Court instructed that “the test is most usefully understood 
as a gloss on the meaning of § 702,”109 the provision of the APA that 
authorizes judicial review for a party “suffering legal wrong” or 
“adversely affected or aggrieved” because of an agency’s action.110 
99. Id. 
100. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
101. 418 U.S. 166 (1974). 
102. Id. at 167–68 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7). 
103. Id. at 175 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
104. Id. at 176–77 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
105. Id. at 179. 
106. See Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970). 
107. Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, __U.S.__, 132 S. Ct. 
2199, 2210 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
108. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 39, at 103, 107–08. 
109. Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 400 n.16 (1987); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra 
note 39, at 107–08. 
110. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012). 
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For example, in Association of Data Processing Service 
Organizations, Inc. v. Camp,111 an association of data processors 
challenged under the APA a ruling by the Comptroller of the Currency 
that allowed banks to engage in data processing services.112 The lower 
courts held that the data processors lacked standing,113 but the Supreme 
Court reversed and remanded.114 The Court held that the data processors 
satisfied the zone-of-interests test because Congress arguably intended to 
protect the data processors’ interests by enacting the Bank Service 
Corporation Act, which prohibited bank service corporations from 
engaging “in any activity other than the performance of bank services 
for banks.”115 By contrast, in Air Courier Conference of America v. 
American Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO,116 the Court used the zone-
of-interests test to dismiss the lawsuit.117 In that case, unions of postal 
workers challenged under the APA the Postal Service’s regulation that 
suspended its monopoly over mailing a certain category of letters.118 The 
lower courts held that the unions satisfied standing because the 
regulation would likely have an adverse effect on postal jobs,119 but the 
Court reversed, holding that the unions did not satisfy the zone-of-
interests test because neither the legislative history nor the relevant 
statutes provide support for the unions’ “assertion that Congress 
intended to protect jobs with the Postal Service.”120 
2.  The Jurisdictional Status of Prudential Standing 
a.  The Minority Approach 
Three circuits—the Second, Sixth, and D.C. Circuits—adopted the 
minority rule. In these circuits, prudential standing is jurisdictional: 
litigants do not forfeit the issue on appeal by failing to dispute it below, 
111. 377 U.S. 150 (1970). 
112. Id. at 151. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. at 158. 
115. Id. at 155 (quoting Bank Service Company Act § 4, 12 U.S.C. § 1864 (1964)); see also id. at 
155–56. The Court held that the data processors satisfied Article III standing because the 
Comptroller’s ruling would increase competition in the industry and thus likely reduce the data 
processors’ profits. Id. at 152.  
116. 498 U.S. 517 (1991). 
117. Id. at 530–31. 
118. Id. at 519–21. 
119. Id. at 524. 
120. Id. at 524–25; see also id. at 526–28 (discussing the legislative history). 
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and courts have a sua sponte obligation to ensure prudential standing is 
proper.121 At times, these courts have simply assumed without analysis 
that there is no procedural distinction between prudential standing and 
Article III standing.122 
Aside from this assumption, the reasons these courts have provided 
for their conclusion are sparse and not thoroughly considered. One court 
addressed the issue in four sentences and reasoned, without citing 
authority, that prudential standing is not akin to an affirmative defense 
that can be forfeited, and that to hold otherwise would allow a litigant’s 
forfeiture to alter the congressional intent embodied in the zone-of-
interests test.123 Another court reasoned, without further elaboration, that 
a party cannot consent to prudential standing because it is not a 
“privilege” that the parties may waive, but rather is a “judicially crafted 
doctrine [that] serves the institutional obligations of the federal 
courts.”124 A third court based its conclusion on an attempt to parse the 
Supreme Court’s ambiguous assertion, in a case that did not involve the 
waiver of prudential standing, that “the standing ‘inquiry involves both 
constitutional limitations on federal-court jurisdiction and prudential 
limitations on its exercise.’”125 Subsequent opinions in these circuits on 
this issue trace back to these opinions without discussion.126 
b.  The Majority Approach 
Seven circuits—the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, 
and Federal Circuits—adopted the majority rule. In these circuits, 
prudential standing is not jurisdictional: litigants forfeit disputing it on 
appeal by failing to dispute it below, and courts do not have a sua sponte 
obligation to ensure that it is proper.127 As with the circuit courts with 
121. E.g., Am. Immigration Lawyers Ass’n v. Reno, 199 F.3d 1352, 1357–58 (D.C. Cir. 2000); 
Bzdzuich v. DEA, 76 F.3d 738, 742 (6th Cir. 1996); Thompson v. Cnty. of Franklin, 15 F.3d 245, 
248 (2d Cir. 1994). 
122. See, e.g., Bzdzuich, 76 F.3d at 742; Mallick v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 749 F.2d 771, 
772 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. United States, 626 F.2d 917, 924 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 
1980). 
123. See Cmty. First Bank v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 41 F.3d 1050, 1053 (6th Cir. 1994). 
124. Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Espy, 23 F.3d 496, 499 (D.C. Cir. 1994).  
125. Thompson v. Cnty. of Franklin, 15 F.3d 245, 247–49 (2d. Cir. 1994) (quoting Gladstone, 
Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979)). 
126. See, e.g., ANR Pipeline Co. v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n, 205 F.3d 403, 407–08 (D.C. Cir. 
2000). 
127. See, e.g., Cibolo Waste, Inc. v. City of San Antonio, 718 F.3d 469, 474 n.4 (5th Cir. 2013); 
United States v. Day, 700 F.3d 713, 720 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 2038 
(2013); City of Los Angeles v. Cnty. of Kern, 581 F.3d 841, 845 (9th Cir. 2009); Finstuen v. 
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the minority rule, these circuit courts did not consider this issue in 
substantial depth when it arose for the first time, but taken together, they 
have articulated three underlying rationales. 
First, some of these circuits have relied on Steel Co. v. Citizens for a 
Better Environment.128 In Steel Co., the Supreme Court forbade federal 
courts from assuming “hypothetical jurisdiction” to resolve the merits 
against a litigant with questionable Article III standing,129 because for a 
court to decide the merits “when it has no jurisdiction to do so is, by 
very definition, for a court to act ultra vires.”130 The Court, however, did 
appear to endorse federal courts deciding the merits of a case before 
addressing the zone-of-interests test, so long as the decision on the 
merits is against the party with a questionable ability to satisfy the zone-
of-interests test.131 The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits held that prudential 
standing is not jurisdictional based at least in part on Steel Co., although 
their reasoning was unclear.132 
Second, the Federal Circuit based its rule on the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in Air Courier Conference of America.133 In that case, postal 
service unions challenged a Postal Service regulation under the APA,134 
and the Postal Service raised a defense—which it had not raised in the 
courts below—that a statute provided that the judicial review provisions 
of the APA “shall [not] apply to the exercise of the powers of the Postal 
Service.”135 The Court held that the Postal Service forfeited the issue 
because “[t]he judicial review provisions of the APA are not 
Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139, 1147 (10th Cir. 2007); MainStreet Org. of Realtors v. Calumet City, Ill., 
505 F.3d 742, 747 (7th Cir. 2007); Gilda Indus., Inc. v. United States, 446 F.3d 1271, 1280 (Fed. 
Cir. 2006); Am. Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 182 F.3d 1261, 1274 n.10 (11th Cir. 1999). 
128. See Am. Iron & Steel Inst., 182 F.3d at 1274 n.10 (relying on Steel Co. v. Citizens for a 
Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83 (1998)); Finstuen, 496 F.3d at 1147 (relying on Grubbs v. Bailes, 445 
F.3d 1275, 1280–81 (10th Cir. 2006) (in turn relying on Steel Co., 523 U.S. 83)). 
129. See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 93–102 (rejecting “doctrine of hypothetical jurisdiction”). 
130. Id. at 101–02. 
131. See id. at 96–97 & n.2. 
132. See Am. Iron & Steel Inst., 182 F.3d at 1274 n.10; Finstuen, 496 F.3d at 1147. This 
Comment attempts to make a more developed consideration of Steel Co.’s relevance in regard to 
whether prudential standing is jurisdictional. See infra Part II.A.3. 
133. See Duty Free Int’l, Inc. v. United States, 88 F.3d 1046, 1048 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (relying on 
Air Courier Conference of Am. v. Am. Postal Workers Union, AFL–CIO, 498 U.S. 517, 523 n.3 
(1991)). 
134. Air Courier Conference of Am., 498 U.S. at 520. 
135. Id. at 522 & n.1 (quoting 39 U.S.C. § 410(a) (1988) (“[N]o Federal law dealing with public 
or Federal contracts, property, works, officers, employees, budgets, or funds, including the 
provisions of chapters 5 and 7 of title 5 [i.e., the relevant provisions of the APA], shall apply to the 
exercise of the powers of the Postal Service.”)). 
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jurisdictional”136 and because whether a statute makes the Postal Service 
exempt from the APA is a question of whether Congress intended to 
allow a cause of action against the Postal Service, not a question of 
jurisdiction.137 The Federal Circuit cited Air Courier Conference of 
America without elaboration to hold that the zone-of-interests test is not 
jurisdictional.138 
Third, these circuits have justified their prudential standing rule based 
on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a).139 This rule provides in 
pertinent part: “An action must be prosecuted in the name of the real 
party in interest.”140 This rule requires that the plaintiff must be the 
person who, according to the governing substantive law, is entitled to 
enforce the right.141 Courts consistently rule that defendants waive this 
defense when they assert it too late in the litigation,142 such as on a 
motion for directed verdict.143 Despite uncertainty about the relationship 
between Rule 17(a) and third-party prudential standing,144 the Fifth and 
Seventh Circuits held that the two are sufficiently similar that third-party 
prudential standing is likewise forfeited if asserted too late.145 
c.  Some Circuit Courts Using the Majority Approach Raise 
Prudential Standing on a Discretionary Basis After the Party 
Forfeits the Issue 
As previously discussed, seven circuits adopted the majority rule that 
136. Id. at 523 n.3 (citing Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 107 (1977) (holding that federal 
courts’ source of subject-matter jurisdiction to review agency actions is provided by the general 
“arising under” jurisdiction of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976) rather than by the APA)). 
137. Id. 
138. See Duty Free Int’l, Inc. v. United States, 88 F.3d 1046, 1048 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
139. See RK Co. v. See, 622 F.3d 846, 851–52 (7th Cir. 2010); Ensley v. Cody Res., Inc., 171 
F.3d 315, 320 & n.10 (5th Cir. 1999). 
140. FED. R. CIV. P. 17(a)(1).  
141. 6A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE § 1543, at 475 (3d ed. 2008). 
142. See, e.g., Steger v. Gen. Elec. Co., 318 F.3d 1066, 1080 (11th Cir. 2003). 
143. See Gogolin & Stelter v. Karn’s Auto Imports, Inc., 886 F.2d 100, 102 (5th Cir. 1989). 
144. Some courts hold that Rule 17(a) codified third-party prudential standing. See, e.g., Warnick 
v. Yassian, 362 F.3d 603, 607–08 (9th Cir. 2004). This may be justified. See 6A WRIGHT ET AL., 
supra note 141, § 1542, at 472 (“[T]he well-settled rule that a party ordinarily does not have 
standing to raise the . . . rights of another person . . . may be thought of as merely a particular 
application of the real-party-in-interest principle.”). However, most courts continue to discuss third-
party prudential standing as a doctrine unrelated to Rule 17(a). See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. 
Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11–12 (2004). 
145. See RK Co. v. See, 622 F.3d 846, 851–52 (7th Cir. 2010); Ensley v. Cody Res., Inc., 171 
F.3d 315, 320 & n.10 (5th Cir. 1999).  
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prudential standing is not jurisdictional.146 Three circuits within this 
group—the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits—nevertheless hold that a 
court may on a discretionary sua sponte basis raise prudential standing 
even though the litigant forfeited the issue.147 These circuits have 
provided two primary reasons for this practice.148 
First, the Seventh and Ninth Circuits relied on the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Craig v. Boren.149 In Craig, the defendant contested the 
plaintiff’s prudential standing for the first time on appeal.150 Rather than 
announce a rule that a prudential standing defense is or is not necessarily 
waived in such circumstances, the Court discussed a balancing analysis 
to determine whether it should consider the issue.151 The Court reasoned 
that under the circumstances of the case, the Court considering 
prudential standing would not further the doctrine’s purpose—to 
minimize judicial intervention in “ill-defined and speculative” 
constitutional questions—because the parties had already sought a 
constitutional determination in the lower courts.152 The Court held, 
however, that even if it did consider the issue, the plaintiff satisfied 
prudential standing.153 The Seventh and Ninth Circuits interpreted this 
discussion in Craig to suggest that courts may decline to address a 
prudential standing argument that was not raised below but may also 
raise the issue.154 
Second, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that third-party prudential 
standing belongs to an “intermediate class” of doctrines that are not 
146. See supra Part I.D.2.b. 
147. See, e.g., Bd. of Miss. Levee Comm’rs v. EPA, 674 F.3d 409, 417 (5th Cir. 2012); RK Co., 
622 F.3d at 851–52; City of Los Angeles v. Cnty. of Kern, 581 F.3d 841, 845 (9th Cir. 2009). 
148. The Fifth Circuit has exercised sua sponte discretion simply by doing so, without explaining 
a rationale. See Bd. of Miss. Levee Comm’rs, 674 F.3d at 418 (“Although the EPA correctly points 
out that we have previously considered the issue sua sponte, . . . we decline to do so here.”). The 
Ninth Circuit has raised sua sponte prudential standing based in part on the doctrine of 
constitutional avoidance, see City of Los Angeles, 581 F.3d at 846; see also Neese v. S. Ry. Co., 350 
U.S. 77, 77–78 (1955) (per curiam) (using the doctrine of constitutional avoidance when the parties 
did not raise the non-constitutional issue), but that doctrine does not support discretionary authority 
to raise prudential standing, see Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold 
Eng’g, P.C., 467 U.S. 138, 157 (1984) (“It is a fundamental rule of judicial restraint . . . that this 
Court will not reach constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them.”).  
149. See City of Los Angeles, 581 F.3d at 846 (relying on Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976)); 
MainStreet Org. of Realtors v. Calumet City, Ill., 505 F.3d 742, 749 (7th Cir. 2007) (Posner, J.) 
(same). 
150. Craig, 429 U.S. at 193. 
151. See id. at 193–94. 
152. Id. 
153. See id. at 194–97. 
154. See City of Los Angeles, 581 F.3d at 846; MainStreet Org. of Realtors, 505 F.3d at 749. 
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jurisdictional but that courts may still raise sua sponte.155 The court 
discussed two examples: the doctrine that a petitioner for federal habeas 
corpus must exhaust state remedies156 and the doctrine of abstention in 
favor of another court or agency.157 The court reasoned that what these 
doctrines share with third-party prudential standing is that they all 
protect interests that the litigants do not represent.158 The court reasoned 
that for the habeas corpus exhaustion-of-state-remedies doctrine, the 
litigants do not represent the court’s interests in benefiting from a lower 
tribunal’s expertise, avoiding unnecessary rulings, and avoiding rulings 
that affront another judicial system; that for abstention doctrine, the 
litigants do not represent the court’s interest in promoting a 
“harmonious” federal system; and that for third-party prudential 
standing, the litigants do not represent the interests of the missing party, 
i.e., the party entitled to legal relief.159 The court thus concluded that, as 
with the other two doctrines, it may raise third-party prudential 
standings.160 
E.  The Supreme Court’s Recent Cases That Distinguish Between 
Jurisdictional Rules, and Claim-Processing Rules or Elements of 
the Merits 
1.  Federal Courts’ Prior Imprecise Use of the Term “Jurisdiction” 
During the era when the circuit courts decided whether prudential 
standing is jurisdictional, federal courts at times used the term 
“jurisdiction” haphazardly. As Judge Kavanaugh explained: “In recent 
years, the terminology of jurisdiction has been put under a microscope at 
the Supreme Court. And the Court has not liked what it has observed—
namely, sloppy and profligate use of the term ‘jurisdiction’ by lower 
courts and, at times in the past, the Supreme Court itself.”161 The 
Supreme Court explained that this occurred when judicial opinions 
155. MainStreet Org. of Realtors, 505 F.3d at 747. 
156. Id. at 747–48 (citing Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 130–33 (1987) (other citations 
omitted)).  
157. Id. at 748 (citing Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 143 n.10 (1976) (other citations omitted)). 
158. Id. 
159. Id. 
160. Id. 
161. Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 693 F.3d 169, 183 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (Kavanaugh, J., 
dissenting), reh’g en banc denied, 704 F.3d 1005 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. denied, __U.S.__, 133 S. 
Ct. 2880 (2013). See generally Howard M. Wasserman, The Demise of “Drive-By Jurisdictional 
Rulings,” 105 NW. U. L. REV. 947 (2011). 
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“obscure the issue by stating that the court is dismissing ‘for lack of 
jurisdiction’ when some threshold fact has not been established, without 
explicitly considering whether the dismissal should be for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction or for failure to state a claim.”162 Such “unrefined 
dispositions,” the Court instructed, are “‘drive-by jurisdictional’ rulings 
that should be accorded ‘no precedential effect’ on the issue whether the 
federal court had authority to adjudicate the claim in suit.”163 
Accordingly, in a recent line of cases, the Court has tried “to bring 
some discipline” to the use of the term jurisdiction.164 The Court’s 
“significantly tightened and focused”165 analysis distinguishes between 
jurisdictional rules, on the one hand, and elements of the merits166 or 
“claim-processing rules,”167 on the other hand. The procedural 
consequences of this distinction are familiar. If a litigant fails to dispute 
at trial a claim-processing rule or an element of the merits, the litigant 
forfeits the issue on appeal.168 By contrast, if the rule is jurisdictional, 
the defense cannot be forfeited and courts must raise the issue sua sponte 
if it is lacking.169 
2.  The Supreme Court’s Trend: Reversing “Drive-By Jurisdictional 
Rulings” 
In the last decade, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that lower 
courts incorrectly labeled an element of the merits as jurisdictional.170 
162. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 511 (2006) (quoting Da Silva v. Kinsho Int’l Corp., 
229 F.3d 358, 361 (2d Cir. 2000)). 
163. Id. (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 91 (1998)). 
164. Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, __U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1202 (2011). 
165. Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n, 693 F.3d at 183 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
166. E.g., Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 503 (“This case concerns the distinction between two sometimes 
confused or conflated concepts: federal-court ‘subject-matter’ jurisdiction over a controversy; and 
the essential ingredients of a federal claim for relief.”). 
167. E.g., Gonzalez v. Thaler, __U.S.__, 132 S. Ct. 641, 648 (2012) (“[W]e have pressed a 
stricter distinction between truly jurisdictional rules, which govern a court’s adjudicatory authority, 
and nonjurisdictional claim-processing rules, which do not.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
168. See Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 504; supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
169. See Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 506–07; supra Part I.A; Part I.C. 
170. See Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 157 (2010) (holding that 17 U.S.C. 
§ 411(a) (2006 & Supp. III 2007–2010), which requires that a copyright must be registered before 
the holder can file a copyright-infringement suit, is an element of the merits rather than a 
jurisdictional rule); Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., __U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2876–77 (2010) 
(holding that whether a statute applies extraterritorially is a question of the merits rather than a 
question of jurisdiction); United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 271 (2010) 
(dictum) (stating that 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2006), which requires that a bankruptcy court find an 
undue hardship on a debtor or the debtor’s dependents before discharging a government-sponsored 
 
                                                     
 
13 - Goodling Comment.docx (Do Not Delete)  10/10/2013  5:33 PM 
2013] JURISDICTION AND PRUDENTIAL STANDING 1171 
One particularly instructive example is the Court’s decision in Arbaugh 
v. Y & H Corp.171 In Arbaugh, the plaintiff sued her employer in federal 
court for sexual harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964.172 She won a jury trial, and the court entered judgment in her 
favor.173 Two weeks later, however, the defendant moved at the trial 
court to dismiss the suit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.174 In the 
defendant’s view, the court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction 
because Title VII applies only to employers that have at least fifteen 
employees,175 which the defendant alleged that it did not have.176 The 
court found that the defendant did not have at least fifteen employees,177 
and, assuming that the fifteen-or-more-employee rule was jurisdictional 
and thus not waived, the court vacated its judgment and dismissed the 
plaintiff’s claim.178 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the 
fifteen-or-more-employee rule is not jurisdictional because Congress did 
not “clearly state” the requirement is jurisdictional.179 Instead, Congress 
located the rule in the “Definitions” section of the Act, entirely separate 
from the Act’s express jurisdiction-conferring provision.180 The Court 
noted that Congress could have made the fifteen-or-more-employee rule 
jurisdictional if it had clearly stated so; but it held that Congress did not 
do so.181 Thus, the fifteen-or-more-employee rule is “simply an element 
of a plaintiff’s claim for relief”182 that a defendant can raise, at the latest, 
student loan debt, is an element of the merits rather than a jurisdictional rule); United States v. 
Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 631 (2002) (holding that a defective indictment is a question of the merits 
rather than a jurisdictional issue). 
171. 546 U.S. 500 (2006). 
172. Id. at 503–04.  
173. Id. at 504. 
174. Id. at 508. 
175. Id. (relying on 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2006)). 
176. Id. 
177. Id. at 509. 
178. Id. 
179. Id. at 515–16. 
180. Id. at 505. The Court explained that Congress enacted Title VII’s jurisdiction-conferring 
provision without an amount-in-controversy provision, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1964), because 
until 1980, general “arising under” jurisdiction of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 had an amount-in-controversy 
requirement of $10,000. Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 505–06. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976 & Supp. 
III 1977–1980), with 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1776 & Supp. IV 1977–1981). Because § 1331 today does 
not have an amount-in-controversy requirement, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006), the two grants of 
jurisdiction are duplicative. Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 505–06; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 39, at 
279. 
181. Id. at 514–15. 
182. Id. at 509. 
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by the end of the trial.183 
The Supreme Court has also recently held that lower courts have 
incorrectly labeled a “claim-processing rule” as jurisdictional.184 Claim-
processing rules are those “rules that seek to promote the orderly 
progress of litigation by requiring that the parties take certain procedural 
steps at certain specified times.”185 In five cases, the Court held that 
rules that prescribe a time limit for certain motions or filings are claim-
processing rules rather than jurisdictional rules.186 Thus, a defense that a 
party violated these claim-processing rules by filing a motion too late 
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.187 The Court has also held 
that several requirements that do not involve time limits are claim-
processing rules, such as the statute that requires a habeas corpus 
petitioner to obtain a qualified “certificate of appealability” in order to 
appeal from a district court’s final order.188 The Court, in sum, has 
repeatedly refused to attach jurisdictional status to rules that Congress 
has not clearly state are jurisdictional. 
183. Id. at 504. 
184. Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinkseki, __U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1200, 1203 (2011). 
185. Id. 
186. See Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 817, 821 (2013) (holding that 
42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(a)(3) (2006), which set a timeline for healthcare providers to file an appeal to 
the Provider Reimbursement Review Board concerning reimbursements due for services rendered to 
Medicare beneficiaries, is a claim-processing rule rather than a jurisdictional rule); Henderson, 131 
S. Ct. at 1200 (holding that 38 U.S.C. § 7266(a) (2006), which sets a timeline for filing a notice of 
appeal from the Board of Veterans’ Appeals to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans 
Claims, is a claim-processing rule rather than a jurisdictional rule); Eberhart v. United States, 546 
U.S. 12, 13 (2005) (per curiam) (holding that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33(b)(2), which 
sets a timeline for filing a motion for a new trial, is a claim-processing rule rather than a 
jurisdictional rule); Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 447 (2004) (holding that Federal Rule of 
Bankruptcy Procedure 4004(a)–(b), which sets a timeline for filing a complaint objecting to a 
debtor’s discharge, is a claim-processing rule rather than a jurisdictional rule); Scarborough v. 
Principi, 541 U.S. 401, 413–14 (2004) (holding that 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B) (2000 & Supp. III 
2001–2004), which sets a timeline for filing a motion for attorneys fees under § 2412(d)(1)(A) for 
the prevailing party in an action against the United States, is a claim-processing rule rather than a 
jurisdictional rule). 
187. See, e.g., Eberhart, 546 U.S. at 19.  
188. See Gonzalez v. Thaler, __U.S.__, 132 S. Ct. 641, 646 (2012) (holding that 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2253(c)(3) (2006) is a claim-processing rule rather than a jurisdictional rule); see also United 
Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 272 (2010) (dictum) (stating that Federal Rule of 
Bankruptcy Procedure 7001(6), which requires that bankruptcy courts use an adversarial proceeding 
to determine the dischargeability of a debt, is a claim-processing rule rather than a jurisdictional 
rule); Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 558 U.S. 67, 81–86 (2009) (holding that 
certain National Railroad Adjustment Board internal procedures are claim-processing rules rather 
than jurisdictional rules). 
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3.  The Case That Broke the Supreme Court’s Trend: Bowles v. 
Russell 
Bowles v. Russell189 stands out within the Supreme Court’s recent 
cases on jurisdiction. In a divided opinion, the Court held that the 
statutory time limit that a district court has for extending the timeline for 
filing an appeal is a jurisdictional rule, not a claim-processing rule.190 In 
so holding, the Court distinguished its recent opinions that held that 
litigation-time-limit rules are claim-processing rules because those cases 
involved court-promulgated rules, such as the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, rather than congressionally enacted statutes.191 This is a 
critical distinction, the Court reasoned, because under Article III, “[o]nly 
Congress may determine a lower court’s subject-matter jurisdiction,” not 
courts.192 Based on this principle and a “century’s worth of precedent 
and practice in American courts” that this statute is jurisdictional,193 the 
Court concluded that “[j]urisdictional treatment of statutory time limits 
makes good sense.”194 
Justice Souter, in dissent, agreed with the majority that court-
promulgated rules, such as the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
cannot be jurisdictional because only Congress defines lower-court 
federal jurisdiction.195 But the dissent disputed the majority’s apparent 
reasoning that because the time limit is prescribed by statute, it is 
therefore jurisdictional.196 Instead, the dissent pointed to Arbaugh’s 
command that statutes are jurisdictional only if Congress “clearly states” 
so: “when Congress does not rank a statutory limitation on coverage as 
jurisdictional, courts should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional in 
character.”197 Thus, the dissent reasoned, the only issue is whether 
Congress put a “jurisdictional tag” on the statutory time limit.198 
According to the dissent, Congress did not: “A filing deadline is the 
paradigm of a claim-processing rule, not of a delineation of cases that 
189. 551 U.S. 205 (2007).  
190. Id. at 206–07 (interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c) (2006)). 
191. Id. at 210–11 (distinguishing Eberhart, 546 U.S. 12, and Kontrick, 540 U.S. 443). 
192. Id. at 211 (quoting Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 452 (in turn citing U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1)). 
193. Id. at 210 n.2. 
194. Id. at 212. 
195. See id. at 217 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“As the [majority opinion] recognizes, [jurisdictional 
status] is no way to regard time limits set out in a court rule rather than a statute.” (emphasis added) 
(citing Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 452 (in turn citing U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1)). 
196. Id. 
197. Id. (quoting Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 516 (2006)). 
198. Id. 
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federal courts may hear.”199 Likewise, the dissent contended that the 
majority opinion’s reliance on a “century’s worth of precedent” was 
misplaced given the Court’s recent refinement of the jurisdictional 
label.200 
II. ARGUMENT 
A.  Prudential Standing Should Not Be Considered Jurisdictional 
1.  Prudential Standing as a Jurisdictional Doctrine Defies the 
Principle That Congress, Within Constitutional Bounds, Sets 
Federal Court Jurisdiction 
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.201 Regardless of 
whether the jurisdictional limit is subject-matter jurisdiction, personal 
jurisdiction, or Article III standing, the only two sources of law that set 
federal court jurisdiction are federal statutes and the Constitution.202 The 
Supreme Court has thus stated: “Federal courts . . . possess only that 
power authorized by Constitution and statute, which is not to be 
expanded by judicial decree.”203 And stated: “Within constitutional 
bounds, Congress decides what cases the federal courts have jurisdiction 
to consider.”204 And again stated: “The limits upon federal jurisdiction, 
whether imposed by the Constitution or by Congress, must be neither 
disregarded nor evaded.”205 Though the quotations could continue,206 it 
suffices to say that the U.S. Reports are shot through with this 
principle.207 It is a fundamental principle in our structure of government. 
199. Id. at 218; accord Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, __U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1203 
(2011) (“Filing deadlines . . . are quintessential claim-processing rules.”). 
200. See Bowles, 551 U.S. at 215–16 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
201. E.g., Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374 (1978). 
202. See supra Part I.A; Part I.B; Part I.C. 
203. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (citations omitted). 
204. Bowles, 551 U.S. at 212. 
205. Owen Equip. & Erection Co., 437 U.S. at 374. 
206. See Gunn v. Minton, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1064 (2013); United States v. Denedo, 556 
U.S. 904, 912 (2009); Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 552 (2005); 
Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986); Palmore v. United States, 411 
U.S. 389, 400–01 (1973); Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 187–88 (1943); Kline v. Burke Constr. 
Co., 260 U.S. 226, 234 (1922); Strader v. Graham, 51 (10 How.) U.S. 82, 96 (1850); Cary v. Curtis, 
44 (3 How.) 236, 245 (1845). 
207. Cf. City of Arlington, Tex. v. FCC, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1872 (2013). The circuit 
courts failed to acknowledge this principle when they decided whether prudential standing is 
jurisdictional. See supra Part I.D.2.a; Part I.D.2.b. 
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Prudential standing as a jurisdictional doctrine defies this principle. 
Prudential standing is a judge-made doctrine, with no basis in statute or 
the Constitution.208 This point is therefore as strong as it is simple: 
prudential standing should not be considered jurisdictional because only 
Congress and the Constitution hold the power to set the jurisdiction of 
federal courts. The Constitution establishes a structure of government 
where the jurisdiction of federal courts cannot be altered by “judicial 
decree.”209 
2.  Prudential Standing Should Not Be Considered Jurisdictional 
Because the Supreme Court’s Recent Line of Cases Reinforces 
That Only Congress, Within Constitutional Bounds, Sets Federal 
Court Jurisdiction 
The Supreme Court’s new framework for analyzing whether a rule is 
jurisdictional reinforces that prudential standing should not be 
considered jurisdictional. The goal of this analysis is to distinguish 
between jurisdictional rules,210 and elements of the merits211 or claim-
processing rules.212 The Court makes this distinction as a matter of 
statutory interpretation under a “clear-statement” principle,213 using this 
“readily administrable bright line” rule: 
If the Legislature clearly states that a threshold limitation on a 
statute’s scope shall count as jurisdictional, then courts and 
litigants will be duly instructed and will not be left to wrestle 
with the issue. But when Congress does not rank a statutory 
limitation on coverage as jurisdictional, courts should treat the 
restriction as nonjurisdictional in character.214 
This analytical framework—based on what Congress clearly states—
reinforces that only Congress, within the bounds set by the Constitution, 
holds the power to set lower federal courts’ jurisdiction. 
Indeed, the Bowles Court expressly acknowledged that court-created 
rules cannot be jurisdictional.215 In the years before Bowles, the Court 
twice held that rules that set the timeline for litigants to file motions are 
208. E.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11–12 (2004). 
209. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). 
210. See Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, __U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1202 (2011). 
211. See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 503 (2006). 
212. See Gonzalez v. Thaler, __U.S.__, 132 S. Ct. 641, 648 (2012). 
213. Id. at 648–49. 
214. Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 515–16 (citations omitted). 
215. See Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 210–13 (2007). 
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claim-processing rules rather than jurisdictional rules.216 In Bowles, 
however, the Court held that a statute prescribing the time limit for filing 
a notice of appeal is jurisdictional.217 The Court reconciled these cases 
based on the distinction that a statutory rule was at issue in Bowles, 
while the prior cases concerned court-promulgated rules, such as the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.218 The Court reasoned that, 
because under Article III “[o]nly Congress may determine a lower 
court’s subject-matter jurisdiction,” the statutory time-of-filing rule is 
jurisdictional, while the court-promulgated time-of-filing rules are 
not.219 
While Bowles was a divided opinion on other points,220 the Court was 
unified on this principle. “As the [majority opinion] recognizes,” the 
dissent stated, jurisdictional status “is no way to regard time limits set 
out in a court rule rather than a statute.”221 This is a ringing endorsement 
that the full Court is unwilling to label a court-created rule—such as 
prudential standing doctrine—as jurisdictional because it conflicts with 
the principle that only Congress and the Constitution hold the power to 
set federal court jurisdiction. Indeed, deeming prudential standing to be 
jurisdictional would be a deeper affront to this principle than deeming 
court-promulgated rules such as the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
to be jurisdictional. The Supreme Court promulgates the latter rules 
through congressionally delegated power222 and with an oversight 
mechanism that allows Congress to override the rules before they take 
effect.223 Prudential standing has no source of congressional power 
whatsoever,224 and therefore should not be considered jurisdictional. 
216. Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 13 (2005) (per curiam) (holding that Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 33(b)(2), which sets a timeline for filing a motion for a new trial, is a claim-
processing rule rather than a jurisdictional rule); Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 446–47 (2004) 
(holding that Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4004(a)–(b), which sets a timeline for filing a 
complaint objecting to debtor’s discharge, is a claim processing rule rather than a jurisdictional 
rule). 
217. Bowles, 551 U.S. at 206–07. 
218. See id. at 211–13. 
219. Id. at 211 (quoting Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 452 (in turn citing U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1)). 
220. See supra notes 196–200 and accompanying text. 
221. Bowles, 551 U.S. at 217 (Souter, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (citing Kontrick, 540 U.S. 
at 452 (in turn citing U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1)). 
222. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072, 2075 (2006). 
223. See id. §§ 2074, 2075. 
224. E.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11–12 (2004). 
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3.  Prudential Standing Should Not Be Considered Jurisdictional 
Because It Concerns Litigants’ Lack of Substantive Rights on the 
Merits, Not Courts’ Adjudicatory Authority 
Even apart from the principle that only Congress and the Constitution 
set federal court jurisdiction, prudential standing should not be 
considered jurisdictional. Although the Supreme Court’s cases refining 
when a rule should be considered jurisdictional based on what Congress 
“clearly states”225 are difficult to apply to judge-made prudential 
standing, the Court’s decisions do provide the key signatures of both 
sides of the Court’s distinction. Thus, looking to these signatures allows 
for an analysis of which side of the distinction prudential standing falls. 
The Court has instructed that jurisdictional rules govern “a court’s 
adjudicatory capacity, that is, its subject-matter jurisdiction or personal 
jurisdiction,”226 while elements of the merits “speak to . . . the rights or 
obligations of the parties,”227 and claim-processing rules “seek to 
promote the orderly progress of litigation by requiring that the parties 
take certain procedural steps at certain specified times.”228 As discussed 
below, all three prudential standing doctrines concern plaintiffs’ lack of 
substantive rights and thus should not be considered jurisdictional.229 
First, the prohibition on third-party prudential standing requires that a 
plaintiff “must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest 
his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.”230 It 
follows, nearly self-evidently, that this doctrine concerns whether the 
plaintiff lacks substantive rights, not the court’s adjudicatory authority, 
and it thus should not be considered jurisdictional.231 This conclusion is 
confirmed by a recent decision where the Supreme Court stated, 
although in a cursory manner, that third-party prudential standing is not 
jurisdictional: 
[Respondents] argue that petitioner cannot state a cause of 
action . . . because [petitioner is attempting to assert the rights of 
225. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 514 U.S. 500, 515–16 (2006). 
226. Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, __U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1202 (2011). 
227. Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 161 (2010) (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film 
Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 274 (1994)). 
228. Henderson, 131 S. Ct. at 1203. 
229. See Fletcher, supra note 75, at 252 (“In the sense the Court employs the term [prudential 
standing], it determines whether a plaintiff has a federal cause of action.”).  
230. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975) (emphasis added). 
231. See Fletcher, supra note 75, at 243–47 (“Properly understood, . . . [i]n third party standing 
cases, . . . the issue is a question of law on the merits: Does the plaintiff have the right to enforce the 
legal duty in question?”). 
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a third party and because its claim is prudentially unripe]. 
Neither objection appeared in the briefs in opposition to the 
petition for writ of certiorari, and since neither is jurisdictional, 
we deem both waived.232 
This statement, however perfunctory it may be, casts a presumption that 
the other two prudential standing doctrines are likewise not 
jurisdictional. 
Second, the zone-of-interests test requires that parties who sue under 
a statute must be arguably within the zone of interests that the statute 
was enacted to benefit.233 The Supreme Court has instructed that the 
zone-of-interests test should be considered a gloss on the meaning of 
“aggrieved” in the provision of the APA that provides a party a cause of 
action for judicial review of an agency’s action.234 The zone-of-interests 
test thus determines a substantive element of a plaintiff’s statutory cause 
of action.235 It therefore should not be considered jurisdictional; indeed, 
the Court has expressly held that “[t]he judicial review provisions of the 
APA are not jurisdictional.”236 
The Supreme Court’s Steel Co.237 decision confirms that the zone-of-
interests test should not be considered jurisdictional. Steel Co. has two 
relevant holdings: 
• Federal courts cannot assume that jurisdiction exists to 
resolve the merits against the party with questionable 
jurisdiction;238 and 
• Federal courts can assume that the zone-of-interests test is 
232. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., __U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 2592, 
2610 (2010) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).  
233. See, e.g., Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970). 
234. See Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 400 n.16 (1987). 
235. See Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 693 F.3d 169 (D.C. Cir. 2012), reh’g en banc denied, 704 
F.3d 1005, 1006 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“[T]he APA gives a cause of action 
to ‘aggrieved’ parties; the zone of interests requirement is simply a way to help determine whether a 
particular party is ‘aggrieved.’”), cert. denied, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 2880 (2013); see also Fletcher, 
supra note 75, at 234–39 (contending that the zone-of-interests test is a “preliminary look at the 
merits” and an “unnecessary surrogate for a determination on the merits of whether plaintiff has 
stated a cause of action” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Lee A. Albert, Justiciability and 
Theories of Judicial Review: A Remote Relationship, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 1139, 1144–54 (1977) 
(same); Lee A. Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Action: An Inadequate Surrogate for 
Claims for Relief, 83 YALE L.J. 425, 493–97 (1974) (same). 
236. Air Courier Conference of Am. v. Am. Postal Workers Union, AFL–CIO, 498 U.S. 517, 523 
n.3 (1991) (citing Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1997)); see also supra notes 133–138 and 
accompanying text. 
237. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83 (1998). 
238. See id. at 93–102 (rejecting the “doctrine of hypothetical jurisdiction”). 
 
                                                     
13 - Goodling Comment.docx (Do Not Delete)  10/10/2013  5:33 PM 
2013] JURISDICTION AND PRUDENTIAL STANDING 1179 
satisfied to resolve the merits against the party with a 
questionable ability to satisfy the zone-of-interests test.239 
The zone-of-interests test accordingly should not be considered 
jurisdictional, because the second Steel Co. holding expressly allows a 
practice for the zone-of-interests test that the first Steel Co. holding 
would prohibit if the zone-of-interests test were jurisdictional. 
Third, the prohibition against generalized grievances precludes 
standing when the asserted harm is a generalized grievance shared in 
“substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens.”240 The 
doctrine dictates that plaintiffs do not have standing for widely shared 
injuries, such as a citizen’s general interest in having the taxes that she 
paid used by the government in a legal manner,241 because such injuries 
are “committed to the surveillance of Congress, and ultimately to the 
political process.”242 The doctrine thus determines that, in such 
circumstances, a plaintiff’s widely shared injury does not amount to a 
judicial cause of action. Under the Supreme Court’s recent cases, the 
doctrine should therefore not be considered jurisdictional.243 
B.  Federal Courts Should Have the Discretion to Raise Sua Sponte a 
Waived Prudential Standing Defense 
Concluding that prudential standing should not be considered 
jurisdictional only partially resolves the current circuit split. Such a 
conclusion means that a litigant who fails to dispute prudential standing 
at trial forfeits disputing the issue on appeal, and that federal courts do 
not have a sua sponte obligation to raise the issue if it is lacking.244 
However, that conclusion does not address whether federal courts may 
still raise the issue sua sponte in their discretion.245 This Comment 
contends that federal courts should have that discretion. 
239. See id. at 96–97 & n.2. 
240. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
241. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 39, at 92. 
242. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974). 
243. But see supra note 90 (discussing the uncertainty over whether the prohibition on 
generalized grievances is a prudential or constitutional doctrine and concluding that if it is a 
constitutional doctrine, then it must be jurisdictional like the rest of Article III standing). 
244. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
245. See supra Part I.D.2.c. 
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1.  The Flexible Nature of Prudential Standing Supports That Federal 
Courts Should Have the Discretionary Ability to Raise the Issue 
Prudential standing is a flexible doctrine where the Supreme Court’s 
discretion is wide-ranging.246 The Court’s discretion is illustrated by the 
fact that the Court created the doctrines without any constitutional or 
statutory source of law247 and then also created exceptions to the 
doctrines.248 Additionally, the Court displayed the doctrine’s substantial 
flexibility last Term in United States v. Windsor.249 The plaintiff in that 
case, Edith Windsor, was in a same-sex marriage recognized by the State 
of New York when Windsor’s spouse died and left her estate to 
Windsor.250 Windsor did not qualify for the marital exemption for 
surviving spouses from the federal estate tax, however, because section 3 
of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) defined marriage for the 
purposes of federal law as only a legal union between one man and one 
woman.251 Windsor filed a tax refund lawsuit, contending that DOMA 
was unconstitutional.252 While the case was pending in the district court, 
President Obama instructed the Attorney General to change the 
Department of Justice’s position and to refuse to defend the 
constitutionality of the law, because he agreed with Windsor that the law 
was unconstitutional.253 In light of this, the district court allowed the 
Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (BLAG) of the House of 
Representatives to intervene as an interested party to defend the suit.254 
The district court held section 3 of DOMA unconstitutional,255 and both 
the Department of Justice and BLAG appealed.256 The Second Circuit 
246. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (“[Prudential] [s]tanding doctrine embraces 
several judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction . . . .”); Warth v. Seldin, 
422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975) (“[Prudential standing doctrines are] essentially matters of judicial self-
governance . . . .”); Ass’n Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970) 
(“[P]roblems of [prudential] standing, as resolved by this Court for its own governance, have 
involved a rule of a self-restraint.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
247. E.g., Warth, 422 U.S. at 499–500. 
248. See supra note 93. 
249. __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
250. Id. at 2682–83. 
251. Id. at 2683 (discussing Defense of Marriage Act § 3, 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012), and I.R.C. 
§ 2056(a) (2006)). 
252. Id. 
253. Id. at 2683–84. 
254. Id. at 2684. 
255. Id. 
256. Id. 
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affirmed.257 
At the Supreme Court, the Court held that the United States satisfied 
Article III standing to appeal because the United States had not yet 
complied with the district court’s order requiring it to pay Windsor a tax 
refund, a “real and immediate economic injury.”258 The Court 
recognized, however, that “prudential concerns . . . might counsel 
against hearing an appeal from a decision with which the principal 
parties agree.”259 Nonetheless, the Court noted that prudential standing 
doctrines are “flexible rules . . . of federal appellate practice”260 and held 
that “countervailing considerations”261 outweighed the prudential 
concern about deciding a case where the principal parties agreed on the 
correct legal result.262 These countervailing considerations were BLAG’s 
“sharp adversarial presentation of the issues” and the vast real-world 
consequences that the Court reasoned would ensue if it did not resolve 
the issue immediately.263 “In these unusual and urgent circumstances,” 
the Court concluded, “the very term ‘prudential’ counsels that it is a 
proper exercise of the Court’s responsibility to take jurisdiction.”264 The 
Court thus proceeded to decide the case, ultimately striking down 
section 3 of DOMA.265 
Windsor illustrates that prudential standing is not only a court-created 
doctrine with court-created exceptions, but also a doctrine subject to ad-
hoc balancing, based on factors including whether the Court deems the 
advocacy to be sufficiently adversarial and the Court’s forecast of the 
257. Id. 
258. Id. at 2686 (quoting Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587, 599 (2007)); see 
also id. (“That the Executive may welcome this order to pay the refund if it is accompanied by the 
constitutional ruling it wants does not eliminate the injury to the national Treasury if payment is 
made, or to [Windsor] if it is not. The judgment orders the United States to pay money that it would 
not disburse but for the court’s order. . . . Windsor’s ongoing claim for funds that the United States 
refuses to pay thus establishes a controversy sufficient for Article III jurisdiction.”). 
259. Id. at 2688. 
260. Id. at 2686 (internal quotation marks omitted) (brackets omitted). 
261. Id. at 2687 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500–01 (1975)).  
262. Id. at 2687–88. Contra id. at 2697–703 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (contending that adverseness 
between the parties’ legal positions is a essential requirement of Article III, not a prudential concern 
subject to countervailing considerations, and that the court therefore lacked jurisdiction). 
263. Id. at 2687–88 (majority opinion) (reasoning that if the Court were to dismiss the suit due to 
the prudential concerns, extensive litigation would ensue, the district courts would be without 
precedential guidance on DOMA’s sweep over more than a thousand federal statutes and 
regulations, the rights and privileges of hundreds of thousands of people would be adversely 
affected, and the cost in judicial resources and expense of litigation would be immense). 
264. Id. at 2688. 
265. See id. at 2689–96. 
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magnitude of the case’s practical consequences.266 With such a 
considerably flexible doctrine, it makes sense that federal courts should 
likewise have the procedural discretion whether to raise the issue after a 
party has forfeited it.267 Put differently, given Windsor and the flexible 
nature of prudential standing, it is difficult to imagine the Court 
establishing a bright-line rule that federal courts cannot under any 
circumstances raise prudential standing after a party has forfeited it. 
Indeed, the Supreme Court has in three cases provided indirect signals 
that endorse federal courts’ procedural discretion to raise prudential 
standing. First, in Craig v. Boren,268 after a party raised a prudential 
standing argument for the first time on appeal, the Court discussed the 
doctrine’s purpose and concluded that employing the doctrine to dismiss 
the case “to await the initiation of a new challenge to the statute by 
injured third parties would be impermissibly to foster repetitive and 
time-consuming litigation under the guise of caution and prudence.”269 
The Court cited no authority for what made this result 
“impermissibl[e],”270 and so, as the Seventh and Ninth Circuits 
reasoned,271 this suggests that the Court is willing to consider on a 
discretionary basis prudential standing issues that have been waived by 
the parties, such as by considering whether the doctrine’s purposes 
would be furthered by doing so.272 In a second case, the Court 
unanimously affirmed a lower court’s opinion that had raised the zone-
of-interests test sua sponte, thus suggesting that the Court endorsed the 
lower court’s practice.273 In a third case, Elk Grove Unified School 
District v. Newdow,274 the Court raised an issue of prudential standing, 
even though the issue had neither been raised in the circuit court 
266. See id. at 2687–88. 
267. Cf. Cibolo Waste, Inc. v. City of San Antonio, 718 F.3d 469, 474 n.4 (5th Cir. 2013) 
(“[Article III standing] goes to the court’s jurisdictional power to hear the case, while the prudential 
limitation goes to the court’s administrative discretion to hear the case.” (emphasis in original) 
(quoting Lewis v. Knutson, 699 F.2d 230, 236 (5th Cir. 1983))). 
268. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
269. Id. at 193–94 (emphasis added). 
270. See id. at 194. 
271. See supra notes 149–154 and accompanying text. 
272. While Craig provides an indication of the Court’s understanding of prudential standing’s 
waiver procedure, the Court’s discussion of that topic is dicta, because the Court went on to hold 
that the plaintiff satisfied prudential standing in any event. See Craig, 429 U.S. at 194–97. 
273. See Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, Dep’t of Labor v. Newport News 
Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 514 U.S. 122, 125, 136 (1995). 
274. 542 U.S. 1 (2004). 
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below275 nor argued in the relevant party’s briefs to the Court,276 and 
ultimately dismissed the suit for lack of prudential standing.277 In sum, 
in addition to the flexible nature of prudential standing as exemplified by 
Windsor, these three cases suggest that the Court supports federal courts 
having the discretion to raise sua sponte prudential standing issues. 
2.  Federal Courts’ Ability to Raise Other Non-Jurisdictional, Judge-
Made Doctrines Designed to Protect Interests Beyond the 
Litigants’ Interests Supports Federal Courts Having the Same 
Ability for Prudential Standing 
Federal courts may raise in their discretion an “intermediate class” of 
doctrines, even though the doctrines are not jurisdictional.278 First, the 
Supreme Court has held that federal courts may raise, in the “interests of 
comity and federalism,” the requirement that a federal habeas corpus 
petitioner exhaust state remedies before petitioning in federal court.279 
Second, the Court has held that federal courts may raise Pullman280 
abstention—i.e., the doctrine that requires federal courts to abstain in 
favor of a state court decision when a state law at issue is uncertain and 
when a state court’s clarification might make the federal court’s 
constitutional ruling unnecessary281—because the doctrine promotes a 
“harmonious relation between state and federal authority”282 and is 
“equitable in nature.”283 Third, the Court has held that federal courts 
may raise ripeness doctrine—i.e., the doctrine of avoiding “premature 
adjudication”284—even when only prudential ripeness concerns are at 
275. See Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 292 F.3d 597, 601–05 (9th Cir.), aff’d, 313 F.3d 500, 502–05 
(9th Cir. 2002), and amended by 328 F.3d 466, 484–85 (9th Cir. 2003), rev’d sub nom. Elk Grove 
Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004). 
276. See Petitioners’ Brief on the Merits at 7–8, 10–21, Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist., 542 U.S. 1 
(No. 02-1624); Petitioners’ Reply Brief at 1–7, Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist., 542 U.S. 1 (No. 02-
1624). 
277. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist., 542 U.S. at 11–18. 
278. MainStreet Org. of Realtors v. Calumet City, Ill., 505 F.3d 742, 747 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(Posner, J.). 
279. See Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 130–34 (1987). 
280. R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). 
281. See id. at 499–502. 
282. Id. at 501. 
283. See Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 143 n.10 (1976); accord Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 
379, 392 n.9 (1979) (recognizing that federal courts may raise Pullman abstention sua sponte). 
284. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967); see also id. at 149 (“[The two elements 
of ripeness] requir[e] us to evaluate both the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the 
hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.”). 
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issue.285 
These three doctrines all originated as judge-made doctrines.286 At a 
doctrinal level, this suggests that judge-made prudential standing should 
likewise join this intermediate class of doctrines that falls short of being 
jurisdictional, but that courts may raise in their discretion. Moreover, the 
Supreme Court’s treatment of prudential ripeness doctrine is particularly 
telling. Ripeness doctrine and standing doctrine overlap at times, such 
that an opinion could fairly describe dismissing the plaintiff’s claim 
either for being unripe or for lacking standing.287 And ripeness, like 
standing, contains both an Article III constitutional dimension and a 
judge-made prudential dimension.288 The way that the Court treats 
prudential ripeness is thus a compelling indicator of how it will treat 
prudential standing.289 
At a theoretical level, federal courts having the discretion to raise 
prudential standing makes sense. In our adversarial legal system, 
litigants—not courts—traditionally carry the burden of investigating and 
presenting their evidence and legal theories at the risk of forfeiture 
because, among other reasons, the litigants’ own interests are at stake 
and they thus have the greatest incentive to develop their case.290 The 
force of this rationale for the adversarial system becomes diluted, 
however, when a court’s decision affects other important interests 
beyond the litigants’ own interests.291 The doctrines in the intermediate 
285. E.g., Nat’l Park Hospitality Ass’n v. Dep’t of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 808 (2003); see also 
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 39, at 121 & n.8 (describing uncertainty in the Supreme Court’s case law 
as to what elements of ripeness are prudential, rather than constitutional, but suggesting that the 
element of hardship on the party is constitutional, while the element of fitness of the issues for a 
judicial decision is prudential). 
286. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 39, at 121, 811, 950.  
287. See, e.g., Colwell v. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 558 F.3d 1112, 1123 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(“Standing and ripeness under Article III are closely related. . . . The constitutional component of 
the ripeness inquiry is often treated under the rubric of standing and, in many cases, ripeness 
coincides squarely with standing’s injury in fact prong.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see 
also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 39, at 119–21. 
288. E.g., Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 57 n.18 (1993). 
289. Compare id. (stating that ripeness encompasses “Article III limitations on judicial power 
and . . . prudential reasons for refusing to exercise jurisdiction”), with Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. 
v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11–12 (2004) (stating that standing encompasses “Article III 
standing . . . and prudential . . . limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction.” (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted)). 
290. See, e.g., WILLIAM BURNHAM, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE 
UNITED STATES 80–85 (3d ed. 2002). 
291. Cf. ROBERT H. FRANK & BEN S. BERNANKE, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 298, 305–09 (4th 
ed. 2009) (discussing the principle of economics that when transaction costs exist and when 
externalities—i.e., “activities that generate costs or benefits that accrue to people not directly 
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class of doctrines address such situations where the adversarial process 
may at times be insufficient to protect the important interests that the 
doctrines serve.292 For example, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that 
because the litigants do not necessarily represent the court’s independent 
interest in maintaining a harmonious federalism system through the use 
of Pullman abstention, federal courts may raise Pullman abstention sua 
sponte.293 
Likewise, a defendant’s waiver of a prudential standing defense 
affects important interests far beyond the defendant’s own interests. 
First, when a defendant waives the third-party prudential standing 
defense, courts should be able to raise the issue to protect the interests of 
the missing party that is entitled to legal relief.294 This is a compelling 
situation for courts to raise the issue because the plaintiff’s interests 
would be directly opposed to the interests of the missing party who is 
entitled to legal relief, yet the missing party would be unrepresented. 
Second, when a defendant waives the zone-of-interests defense, courts 
should be able to raise the issue to ensure that Congress’s interests are 
not flouted because, in such circumstances and absent judicial 
intervention, a plaintiff who Congress did not intend to benefit by 
enacting a statute would be enabled to sue under the statute.295 Third, 
when a defendant waives the prohibition on generalized grievances 
defense, courts should be able to raise the issue to promote judicial 
economy by avoiding rulings on questions of “broad social import where 
no individual rights would be vindicated” and to enhance their decision-
making process by only entertaining suits from “those litigants best 
suited to assert a particular claim.”296 Moreover, in such circumstances, 
courts should be able to raise the prohibition on generalized grievances 
to promote the robustness of the political process, because the lawsuits 
that the doctrine prohibits are “committed to the surveillance of 
involved in those activities”—occur, government intervention may enhance efficiency and welfare); 
R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15–19 (1960) (emphasizing that in such 
circumstances government intervention may—but need not necessarily—enhance efficiency and 
welfare). 
292. See MainStreet Org. of Realtors v. Calumet City, Ill., 505 F.3d 742, 748 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(Posner, J.). 
293. See id. 
294. See id. 
295. Cf. Cmty. First Bank v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 41 F.3d 1050, 1053 (6th Cir. 1995) 
(reasoning that a litigant’s forfeiture should not be able to alter the congressional intent embodied in 
the zone-of-interests test).  
296. Gladstone, Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99–100 (1979). 
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Congress, and ultimately to the political process.”297 
In sum, the interests that prudential standing serves are much broader 
than an individual litigant’s interests, and a litigant’s waiver thus should 
not be able to undermine the doctrine’s purposes. This supports that 
judge-made prudential standing should join the intermediate class of 
other judge-made doctrines where courts may raise the issue in their 
discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court should, in the appropriate case, definitively 
resolve the current circuit split concerning whether prudential standing is 
jurisdictional. The Court should hold that prudential standing is not 
jurisdictional because only the Constitution and Congress hold the 
power to set the jurisdiction of federal courts, because the Court’s recent 
line of cases on jurisdiction reinforces that court-created doctrines 
cannot be jurisdictional, and because prudential standing doctrines 
concern litigants’ lack of rights on the merits, not the adjudicatory 
authority of federal courts. However, the Court should also hold that 
federal courts have the discretion to raise prudential standing sua sponte 
after a litigant has waived the issue. This practice is most consistent with 
the flexible nature of prudential standing doctrine itself, and is supported 
by federal courts’ ability to raise in their discretion three other non-
jurisdictional doctrines—the requirement that habeas corpus petitioners 
exhaust state remedies, Pullman abstention, and prudential ripeness—
that, like prudential standing, originated as judge-made doctrines 
designed to protect interests beyond the litigants’ individual interests. 
 
297. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974). 
 
                                                     
